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No. 20060702-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LORIN BLAUER,

Petitioner,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES, an agency of the
and UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

State of Utah,

Respondents.

Brief of Department of Workforce Services

Statement of Jurisdiction
Blauer's petition seeks review of the Career Service Review Board's
(CSRB) June 28, 2006 decision on the merits and its July 27, 2006 order
denying reconsideration. In his opening brief, Blauer asserts jurisdiction
based only upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b) (West 2004), which confers
jurisdiction on this Court over appeals from "the final orders and decrees
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies." As
discussed in Point 1 below, however, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider

CSRB's June 28, 2006 decision because Blauer failed to timely file a petition
for review of that decision and his untimely request for reconsideration did
not toll his time to file a petition for review. Although this Court does not
have jurisdiction to review CSRB's decision on the merits, it does have
jurisdiction over CSRB's subsequent order denying reconsideration because
the petition for review was filed within 30 days of that order.

Issues Presented
1. Jurisdiction
Because Blauer's petition for review was filed thirty-four days after
CSRB's decision denying Blauer's employment grievance, the petition is
untimely unless the time to file was tolled. Blauer had filed a request for
reconsideration, but it too was untimely. Did Blauer's untimely request for
reconsideration toll the time to file his petition?

A. Standard of Review
"[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be to determine
whether the requested action is within its jurisdiction. When a matter is
outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the
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action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App.
1989).

B. Preservation of the Issue
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction, because they are threshold
issues, may be raised at any time and are addressed before resolving other
claims. State v. Sun Surety Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74, f 7, 99 P.3d 818, 820. This
issue is unique to the appeal and does not call for a review of the CSRB's
decision.

2. Substantial evidence supports CSRB's decision
Blauer fails to mention significant evidence presented to the CSRB that
supports its factual findings. Should the findings of fact be affirmed due to
Blauer's failure to marshal?
Blauer challenges CSRB's choice of competing inferences which could
have been drawn from conflicting evidence and attempts to reargue the
weight of the evidence. Should the factual findings be affirmed?

3

A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the findings of an administrative agency under a
clearly erroneous standard. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah
1997). This Court will "generally reverse only if the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence." Id.

B. Preservation of the Issue
This issue was considered by CSRB in its Decision and Final Agency
Action. R. 864-71.

3. CSRB correctly applied the law
While on medical leave from his position with the Department of
Workforce Services (Department), Blauer was approved for long-term
disability benefits due to a psychological illness. After one year of medical
leave, Blauer did not demonstrate that he had recovered from his
psychological illness but instead asked to be returned to work with
accommodation for a physical condition. The Department terminated Blauer's
employment pursuant to a state personnel rule that requires termination if
an employee cannot return to work after one year of medical leave. Did CSRB
4

correctly apply this rule in affirming the termination?

A. Standard of Review
Since this issue raises a question of general law, this Court reviews the
"CSRB's conclusion for correctness, granting no deference to that agency's
decision." Holland v. CSRB, 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993).

B. Preservation of the Issue
This issue was considered by CSRB in its Decision and Final Agency
Action. R. 871-74.

Determinative Constitutional
Provisions, Statutes and Rules
The following provisions are attached in Addendum D:
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (West 2004)
Utah Admin. Code R. 477-7-17 (2004)

5

Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case
This is a petition for judicial review of final agency action of the CSRB

that affirmed the Department's decision terminating Blauer's employment.

2.

Course of the Proceedings Below
On November 3, 2004, Blauer was dismissed from his position as Legal

Enforcement Counsel III with the Department. R. 895, Agency Ex. 7.1 The
termination of Blauer's employment was based on his inability to return to
work after taking one year of medical leave. Id.
Blauer appealed the termination to the CSRB. R. 1. After holding a step
5 evidentiary hearing, a CSRB hearing officer affirmed the termination.
R. 677-91. Blauer then appealed the hearing officer's decision and CSRB
conducted a formal appellate review of that decision. R. 856-75. CSRB issued
its Decision and Final Agency Action on June 28, 2006, affirming the hearing
officer. Id.
Twenty-two days later, on July 20, 2006, Blauer filed a request for
J

Because the exhibits received into evidence at the CSRB evidentiary
hearing are not individually Bates-stamped, this brief will cite to them by
referring to Bates number of the first page of the exhibit volume, R. 895,
followed by the exhibit number.
6

reconsideration of the CSRB's decision. R. 882-87. On July 27, 2006, CSRB
issued an order denying the request for reconsideration as untimely because
it was filed more than twenty days after CSRB's Decision and Final Agency
Action. R. 888-90. Blauer then filed the present petition for review on August
1, 2006, thirty-four days after CSRB's Decision and Final Agency Action.

3.

Disposition Below
By its decision dated June 28, 2006, CSRB affirmed the hearing officer's

decision that Blauer's employment was properly terminated. R. 856-75. By its
order dated July 27, 2006, CSRB denied Blauer's request for reconsideration.
R. 888-90.

Statement of Facts
On October 8, 2003, Blauer went on medical leave. R. 893 at 10. Blauer
then applied for long-term disability benefits and received a psychological
evaluation as part of the application process. R. 895, Agency Exs. 1 & 2. In
July of 2004, while still on medical leave, Blauer was approved for long-term
disability benefits based upon a psychological illness. R. 894 at 292; R. 895,
7

Agency Ex. 4.
While Blauer was on medical leave, the Department kept open his
position of Legal Enforcement Counsel III. R. 893 at 79. Immediately before
taking medical leave, Blauer's assigned responsibilities consisted entirely of
conducting unemployment insurance hearings. R. 893 at 111-12. Ninety
percent or more of these hearings were conducted telephonically with a
speakerphone. R. 893 at 76. During any telephonic hearing, Blauer was not
required to remain in a stationary, seated position but could walk back and
forth or alternate between sitting and standing as he wished. Id.
This assignment to conduct hearings full time was given only a few
weeks before Blauer went on medical leave, and Blauer previously litigated a
grievance where he argued that this assignment was a demotion. That
litigation culminated in a decision by this Court that the reallocation of
Blauer's job responsibilities to conduct hearings full time did not constitute a
demotion to a lesser position, but was merely an extension of a core job
function of the position he held. See Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2005
UT App 488, n 32-36,128 P.3d 1204. Blauer's position was considered a
sedentary position, both before and after his reassignment. R. 893 at 75.
On October 1, 2004, the Department notified Blauer that his one year of
medical leave would be ending soon and that, if he were able to return to
8

work, he needed to contact the Department and provide a medical release:
Last year, you were placed on medical leave for a medical
reason, and subsequently you were found eligible for the Long
Term Disability Program (LTD). The Department of Human
Resource Management rule R477-7-17(l) states that employees
shall be granted up to one year of medical leave under these
conditions. Our records show that your last day worked was
October 8, 2003.
If your condition has improved and you are able to return to
work, please contact Wendy Peterson . . . so that we can arrange
for your return. If you are still unable to return to work, your
employment with the Department will be terminated. . . .
You have until October 5, 2004[,] to contact Wendy and
arrange for your return to work, or submit written documentation
as to why your employment with the department should not be
terminated at this time. If you are able to return to work, you will
need to provide a medical release.
R. 895, Agency Ex. 5 (emphasis added).
On October 4, 2004, Blauer responded, through his attorney, by stating
that his medical condition had not changed and that he remained disabled
from conducting unemployment hearings full time. R. 895, Grievant Ex. 24.
Blauer referred to his assignment conducting hearings as a demotion. Id.
On October 8, 2004, the Department reiterated to Blauer that the same
position he had occupied before going on medical leave was still in fact open
and available for him to return to; the Department also advised Blauer of a
pre-termination hearing that had been set since he had not yet returned to
work. R. 895, Agency Ex. 6. At the pre-termination hearing, Blauer presented

9

no information that he had recovered from the psychological illness on which
his long-term disability status was based. R. 893 at 61-62; R. 894 at 293. He
presented no medical release stating that he had recovered from the
psychological illness. Id. He did not even mention his psychological illness at
all, but instead addressed only physical health issues. Id. Blauer wanted to be
able to select his supervisor and wanted to unilaterally reallocate his job
responsibilities to avoid holding hearings full time. R. 893 at 62.
Because Blauer was unable to return to work, the Department
terminated his employment on November 3, 2004. R. 895, Agency Ex. 7. Nine
months later, at the CSRB step 5 hearing, Blauer testified that he was still
receiving long-term disability benefits, that he still had not received a medical
release stating that he had recovered from his psychological illness, and that
he had not notified the provider of his disability benefits that he was no
longer disabled. R. 894 at 294-95; 298.

10

Summary of the Argument
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review CSRB's decision on the merits
because Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration did not toll his time to
file a petition for review. Because CSRB had no authority to hear the
untimely request for reconsideration, that request did not suspend the
finality of CSRB's decision and Blauer should have filed his petition for
review within thirty days of that decision instead of within thirty days of the
order denying reconsideration.
CSRB's factual findings should be affirmed because Blauer has failed to
marshal the evidence. In any event, the findings should be affirmed because
they are supported by substantial evidence. Blauer's attack on the CSRB's
findings lacks merit because it is merely an attempt to reargue the weight of
the evidence considered by CSRB. Because Blauer had not recovered from the
psychological illness for which he went on medical leave, CSRB correctly
concluded that Blauer could not return to work and a state personnel rule
required the Department to terminate his employment.

11

Argument
1. Because Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration did not toll the
time to file a petition for review, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review
CSRB's decision
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either
party or by the court. Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 596, 597 (Utah
1997). Without statutory authority to review the action of an administrative
agency, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the agency action. Dep't of
Envtl. Quality v. Golden Gardens Water Co., 2001 UT App 173,1113, 27 P.3d
579.
Absent an event that tolled the time to file a petition for review,
Blauer's petition is untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after
CSRB's Decision and Final Agency Action. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b14(3)(a) (West 2004) (requiring petition for judicial review be filed "within 30
days after the date that the order constituting final agency action is issued");
Viktron/Lika

Utah v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 8,117, 18 P.3d 519

(holding that failure to timely file a petition for judicial review is a
jurisdictional defect). The thirty days to file began to run from June 28, 2006,
the date on the face of CSRB's decision. See Dusty's Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842
P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992). Instead of filing his petition within thirty days, by
12

July 28, 2006, he filed his petition on August 1, 2006, four days late. Thus,
barring any event which tolled Blauer's time to file the petition, his petition
was untimely and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review CSRB's June 28,
2006 decision.
Although Blauer filed a request for reconsideration, this did not toll the
period to seek judicial review because the request was filed two days late.
Blauer had twenty days from June 28, 2006, to file his request for
reconsideration - until Tuesday, July 18, 2006 - but did not file Thursday,
July 20, 2006. R. 882-87. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a) (limiting
request for reconsideration to "[wlithin 20 days" of final agency action).
Utah's appellate courts have held that a request for reconsideration tolls the
time to seek review, but only in cases where the request for reconsideration is
timely. See Bourgeous v. Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Occupational & ProfI
Licensing, 1999 UT App 146, ff 11-12, 981 P.2d 414 (request for
reconsideration was filed "within the twenty-day period permitted by
statute"); 49th St Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 998 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (agency decision issued November 20 and request for
reconsideration timely filed twenty days later on December 10); Orton v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 864 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (final decision
entered September 4 and request for reconsideration timely filed twenty days
13

later on September 24).
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)2 expressly requires a
request for reconsideration to be filed within twenty days of the agency's final
decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a) (West 2004). Regardless of
whether a request for reconsideration is affirmatively denied on jurisdictional
grounds, as it was here, or whether it is deemed denied by CSRB's failure to
issue a ruling, an untimely request does not toll the time to appeal because it
asks CSRB to do something it cannot do. Other than a good cause extension,3
which was neither sought nor granted in this case, there is no basis in the
language of UAPA or in case law for the notion that CSRB could hear or grant
Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration. In fact, the plain language of
UAPA - limiting a request for reconsideration to a strict twenty-day limit expressly foreclosed CSRB from considering the untimely request on its
merits.
Although Blauer's reconsideration request was only two days late, it
was nevertheless outside UAPA's plain twenty-day limitation. Allowing an
2

UAPA consists of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -23, inclusive.

3

The Utah Supreme Court has held that an agency's granting of a "good
cause" extension to seek reconsideration will toll the thirty-day period to seek
review. See Harper Invs., Inc. v. Auditing Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 868
P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1994). However, Blauer did not request an extension and
did not make a showing of good cause.
14

untimely request for reconsideration to toll the time to seek review would
eviscerate finality in agency decisions. It would allow a party to indefinitely
extend the time to seek judicial review, simply by filing an untimely request
for reconsideration well outside UAPA's strict twenty-day limit. Blauer's
approach interprets UAPA's deadline as meaningless. See Hall v. Dep't of
Corr., 2001 UT 34, f 15, 24 P.3d 958 (holding court should avoid
interpretations that will render portions of statute meaningless).
The Utah Supreme Court recently observed that "we, like the court of
appeals, can find no principled reason to treat agency petitions differently
than other appeals." Harley Davidson v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005 UT 38,
f 14, 116 P.3d 349. In keeping with that holding, the tolling implications of
Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration should be the same as those
raised by an untimely post-judgment motion under Utah R. App. P. 4. The
situation here is equivalent to an appeal from a district court judgment where
the notice of appeal is filed within thirty days of the disposition of an
untimely post-judgment motion, but not within thirty days of the final
judgment. In that situation, this Court would lack jurisdiction to review the
underlying judgment because Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1) tolls the appeal time
only as to certain timely post-judgment motions. See Albretson v. Judd, 709
P.2d 347, 347 (Utah 1985) (holding that because no tolling post-judgment
15

motion was filed within requisite time period after judgment was entered,
time to appeal was not extended). Just as an untimely Rule 59 motion for a
new trial, for example, does not suspend the finality of a district court's final
judgment, an untimely request for reconsideration of an agency decision does
not suspend the finality of the agency's decision because the agency is
powerless under UAPA to hear that request. Accordingly, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to review CSRB's decision on the merits.

2. CSRB's factual findings should be upheld because Blauer failed to
marshal the evidence and because those findings are supported by
substantial evidence

A. Failure to marshal
CSRB's factual findings should be affirmed because Blauer has failed to
marshal the evidence supporting CSRB's decision. Before this Court "will
subject an agency's findings to the substantial evidence test, the party
challenging the findings 'must marshal all the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the [agency's] findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.'" VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n of
Utah, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v.
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County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)) (bracketed
material in original).
This Court has compared the marshaling process to becoming the
devil's advocate, where the challenging party must present every scrap of
competent evidence supporting the challenged finding:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's
advocate. Counsel must remove himself or herself from the
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order
to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists. After
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate
court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly
erroneous.
Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 727-28 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quotation marks
and citation omitted, emphasis in original).
Blauer has not only failed to present every scrap of competent evidence
supporting CSRB's decision, but he has omitted considerable evidence
supporting that decision. He omits significant evidence regarding the nature
of his job duties, the nature of the position held open for him, and the
requirement that he provide a medical release before returning to work.
Moreover, much of his factual statement is argumentative, even the three-

17

paragraph section ironically designated as the marshaling section.
First, Blauer omits significant evidence of the nature of his job duties
that supports CSRB's finding that the same position was held open for him.
Blauer fails to discuss his previously litigated grievance and this Court's
conclusion that the reallocation of Blauer's job responsibilities to conduct
hearings full time did not constitute a demotion to a lesser position, but was
merely an extension of a core job function of the position he held. See Blauer
2005 UT App 488 at <H 32.
Second, Blauer omits evidence of the nature of his job duties that
refutes his claim that he had physical disabilities in addition to his
psychological illness. For example, Blauer fails to mention that ninety percent
or more of the hearings Blauer conducted were done telephonically with a
speakerphone, so Blauer would not have been confined to a stationary
position during the hearings but could have walked around or alternated
between sitting and standing. R. 893 at 76. This omission is particularly
egregious because the bulk of Blauer's argument that he physically could not
conduct hearings full time is based on his assertion that he could not sit or
stand very long in a stationary position.
Third, Blauer omits evidence regarding his failure to submit a medical
release. Blauer erroneously asserts that the requirement to furnish a medical
18

release was "not required of him as part of any pre-termination
communication." Aplt. Brf. at 23. Yet the letter sent to Blauer on October 1,
2004, stated: "If you are able to return to work, you will need to provide a
medical release." R. 895, Agency Ex. 5 (attached as Addendum A). Blauer not
only failed to produce a medical release, but he made no representations at
his pre-termination hearing that he had recovered from his psychological
condition or that he could obtain a release. R. 893 at 61-62.
Because Blauer has failed to marshal the evidence that supports the
CSRB's factual findings, those findings should be affirmed.

B. Substantial evidence

Even if Blauer has adequately marshaled the evidence, he has failed to
show that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Much of
Blauer's argument asks this Court to improperly substitute its judgment as
between two reasonably conflicting views. EAGALA u. Dep't of Workforce
Servs., 2007 UT App 43, f 16, — P.3d — (stating that this Court does not
"substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even
though we may have come to a different conclusion had the case come before
us for de novo review") (citation and quotation marks omitted). But it is the
provision of the agency, "not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence,
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and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is
for the [agency] to draw the inferences/' Id.
This Court will "generally reverse only if the findings are not supported
by substantial evidence." Drake, 939 P.2d at 181. Substantial evidence is
"that which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion/' Stewart v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 831 P.2d
134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla
of evidence, though less than the weight of the evidence." Commercial
Carriers v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 888 P.2d 707, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, "[t]he marshaled facts
should 'correlate particular items of evidence with the challenged findings.'"
Neely, 51 P.3d at 728 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Co., 818 P.2d
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). This Court has stated that "we do not want
an exhaustive review of all of the evidence presented at trial. Rather, we want
a precisely focused summary of all the evidence that supports any finding
that is challenged on the ground that it is clearly erroneous." Neely, 51 P.3d
at728n.l.
As set forth below, CSRB's findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
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The position Blauer left was held open for him while he was on medical leave
Substantial evidence supports CSRB's finding that the same position
Blauer left was held open for him while he was on medical leave. This Court
concluded in Blauer that the reallocation of Blauer's job responsibilities to
conduct hearings full time did not constitute a demotion to a lesser position,
but was merely an extension of a core job function of the position he held. See
Blauer, 2005 UT App 488 at % 32. While it is true that his assigned duties on
the day he went on medical leave were not the same duties he had before the
reallocation, this Court's decision in Blauer renders that inquiry irrelevant.
Yet, despite that decision, much of Blauer's brief is devoted to revisiting the
irrelevant distinction between what his duties were on the day he went on
medical leave and what they had been historically, before the reassignment
addressed in Blauer. To the extent that Blauer's arguments rely on the
erroneous factual assertion that he was not offered the same position, they
are not grounded in fact and should be rejected by this Court.
Because conducting hearings full time was a valid extension of a core
job function and was not a demotion to a lesser position, that specific
assignment was properly considered by the CSRB as the position to which
Blauer would have returned, had he demonstrated recovery from his
psychological illness. The Department presented unequivocal testimony that
21

his exact position was in fact held open for him during his medical leave and
that he would have resumed the identical duties to which he was assigned on
the day he went on medical leave. R. 893 at 79, 111. Because this evidence
supports CSRB's finding that the assignment to conduct hearings full time
was the same position he had left, that finding should be affirmed.

Blauer went on medical leave for psychological reasons

Substantial evidence supports CSRB's finding that Blauer went on
medical leave for psychological illness. This finding is supported by evidence
that Blauer was approved for long-term disability benefits for psychological,
but not physical, illness while on medical leave. R. 894 at 292; R. 895, Agency
Ex. 4. And although Blauer presented evidence regarding physical difficulties
he had with sitting or standing for long periods of time,4 the Department
presented conflicting evidence that Blauer's assignment to conduct hearings
full time would not require him to sit or stand for long periods of time. R. 893
at 76. Blauer could walk around or alternate between sitting and standing, at
his option, during most of the hearings he conducted since at least ninety

4

Blauer claims at pages 9-10 of his brief that he went on medical leave
because of a physical disability only, not psychological. In support of this, he
cites only to R. 893 at 10, which contains the date he went on leave but not
the reason.
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percent of the hearings were conducted telephonically with a speakerphone.
Id. Because the inference CSRB ultimately drew - that Blauer went on
medical leave for psychological reasons - is supported by this evidence, it
should affirmed.5 See EAGALA, 2007 UTApp 43 at J 16 (stating that this
Court does not "substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting
views").

Blauer was notified of his obligation to demonstrate recovery from psychological
illness

Substantial evidence supports CSRB's finding that Blauer was notified
of his obligation to demonstrate recovery from his psychological illness. As
noted previously, the Department sent Blauer a letter before his termination,
stating: "If you are able to return to work, you will need to provide a medical
release." R. 895, Agency Ex. 5 (attached as Addendum A). Blauer implies that
his failure to produce a medical release was merely a technicality that the
Department should have given him a chance to remedy. But the medical
release never became an issue in and of itself because Blauer never asserted
5

Blauer fails to include evidence of accommodations made by the
Department for Blauer's physical condition before he went on medical leave.
Based on the recommendations of the State ergonomic specialist, Blauer's
desk was raised so he could stand at his desk; he was provided dictation
equipment and an audio player so he could listen to recordings of hearings
and dictate documents as he walked around his office. R. 893 at 77-78.
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in the first place that he had recovered from his psychological illness. R. 893
at 61. Furthermore, in implying that he could have obtained a release if he
had just been given the opportunity, Blauer fails to mention that, nine
months after his termination, he was still receiving long term disability
benefits and still had not received a release - verbal or written - to return to
work based on recovery from psychological illness. R. 894 at 294-95, 298.

Blauer did not demonstrate recovery from psychological illness

Substantial evidence supports CSRB's finding that Blauer did not
demonstrate recovery from his psychological illness. Blauer erroneously relies
on the October 4, 2004 letter from his counsel to assert that he in fact
demonstrated recovery from his psychological illness. Because the letter was
devoted to perpetuating Blauer's sophistic insistence that holding hearings
full time was a demotion, the letter communicated little of anything. See R.
895, Grievant Ex. 24 (attached as Addendum B). Neverthless, the letter
stated that Blauer's condition had "not changed" and he remained disabled
from conducting hearings full time. Id. Even if an inference could reasonably
be drawn from this letter that Blauer had recovered from his psychological
illness, CSRB drew the opposite inference. CSRB's finding that Blauer failed
to demonstrate a recovery from his psychological illness is further supported
24

by Blauer's failure at the pre-termination hearing to even discuss his
psychological illness. R. 894 at 293. The finding is likewise supported by
Blauer's own admission that nine months after his termination he still had
not received a release - verbal or written - to return to work based on
recovery from psychological illness. R. 894 at 298.

3. CSRB correctly applied the law

A. Application of Utah Admin. Code R. 477-7-17

CSRB correctly applied Utah Admin. Code R. 477-7-17 (2004), which
required a state agency to terminate an employee who was unable to return
to work after one year of medical leave:
(1) An employee who is determined eligible for the Long Term
Disability Program (LTD) shall be granted up to one year of
medical leave, if warranted by a medical condition.
(a) The medical leave begins on the last day the
employee worked.
(3) Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include:
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one
year of the last day worked, the agency shall place the
employee in the previously held position or similar
position in a comparable salary range provided the
employee is able to perform the essential functions of the
job with or without reasonable accommodation.
(b) If an employee is unable to perform the essential
25

functions of the position because of a permanent disability
that qualifies as a disability under the ADA, the agency
shall place the employee in the best available, vacant
position for which the employee qualifies and is able to
perform the essential functions of the position with or
without reasonable accommodation.
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within
one year after the last day worked, the employee shall be
separated from state employment.
As set forth above, CSRB correctly found that Blauer failed to demonstrate
that he had recovered from his psychological illness. Because Blauer did not
demonstrate that he was able to work, the plain language of the rule
mandated the termination of his employment. Only if Blauer had
demonstrated that his recovery from the psychological illness made him able
to work would any accommodation due to Blauer's physical health have
become an issue. Moreover, Blauer has failed to demonstrate that the two
accommodations requested - that he be given a new supervisor and not be
required to hold hearings full time — were reasonable accommodations under
the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). See Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117
F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that no ADA disability exists where
plaintiff "merely cannot work under certain supervisor because of the stress
and anxiety it causes" (citing Weiler v. Household Finance Corp., 101 F.3d
519, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247, 1261
(10th Cir. 2001) (stating that job restructuring accommodation that
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eliminates the essential function of the job is not reasonable).

B. CSRB's decision denying reconsideration

By failing to brief the issue of whether CSRB correctly denied his
request for reconsideration, Blauer has waived this issue. See Brown v.
Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^23, 16 P.3d 540 (stating that, generally, any issues "that
were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be
considered by the appellate court"). Blauer notes in his opening brief that
whether CSRB correctly concluded the reconsideration request was untimely
is an issue for this court to review, yet he fails to present any argument or
analysis why the CSRB erred. Moreover, Blauer fails to specifically address
whether his request for reconsideration was in fact filed twenty-two days
after CSRB's final decision.
In any event, CSRB correctly determined that the request for
reconsideration was filed outside UAPA's twenty-day limit. As noted above,
CSRB's decision on the merits was considered issued on June 28, 2006, the
date it bore on its face. See Dusty's, 842 P.2d at 870. Blauer filed his request
for reconsideration twenty-two days later, on Thursday, July 20, 2006.
R. 882-87 (attached as Addendum C). But his request should have been filed
within twenty days - by Tuesday, July 18, 2006. See Utah Code Ann. § 6327

46b-13(l)(a). Since the request for reconsideration was brought two days
outside the statutorily allowed time, CSRB correctly concluded that the
request was untimely.

Conclusion
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Blauer's challenge to CSRB's
decision on the merits because Blauer's untimely request for reconsideration
did not toll his time to appeal. CSRB's factual findings should be affirmed
because Blauer has failed to marshal the evidence and because those findings
are supported by substantial evidence. CSRB correctly applied the law in
concluding that, because Blauer could not return to work after one year of
medical leave, the Department was required to terminate his employment.

Dated this /-I

day of March, 2007.

J. CLIFFORD PETERSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Department of Workforce Services
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Certificate of Service
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing Brief of
Department of Workforce Services to the following this "Zffi^-day of March,
2007:
Vincent C. Rampton
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Robert Thompson, Administrator
Career Service Review Board
State Office Building, Room 1120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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ADDENDUM A

OLJENES. WALKER
Gum* nor
GAYUt F. MCKEACHKIE

JtAYlXNEDUBlAJlD
£accutfar Director

State of Utah
Department of
orkforce Services

DAJUNBRU5D
Deputy tkrraot
J AMES C WHTIAKER
Deputy Director

October i, 2004

Lorin Blauer
460 North 900 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Dear Lorin:
Last year, you were placed on leave for a medical reason, and subsequently were found eligible
for the Long Term Disability Program (LTD). The Department of Human Resource
Management rule R477-7-J7 0 ) states that employees shall be granted up to one year of medical
Ifeave under those conditions. Our records show that your last day worked was October 8,2003.
If your condition has improved and you are able to return to work, please contact Wendy
Peterson at (801) 526-4334 so that we can arrange for your return. If you are still unable to
return to work, your employment with the Department wDl be terminated. Termination of your
employment under these circumstances does not affect your eligibility for rehire. In the event
your condition improves later, you may reapply for any vacant positions avaflable within our
Department. This action does not affect your eligibility to remain on LTD, which provides you
with benefits that include monthly payments, medical insurance coverage, and service credit
towards retirement.
You have until October 5,2004 to contact Wendy and arrange for your return to work, or submit
written documentation as to why your employment with the department should not be
terminated at this time. If you are able to return to work, you wfll need to provide a medical
rdease.
If we do not hear from you, we will take you off they payroll in accordance with the DHRM rule
cited above. We thank you for the work you have performed for the department in the past and
wish you weD in the future.
Sincerely,

/bAnne Campbell
Human Resource Director

]40£a3J300Soo1k,SahUkcCJry.t^M))|'Tc»cp^
A prow) wcaba of America1* Workforce Network* Eq»*) Opportunity Eapfoycf/frognuBS
rtrrir A»CO

Utah!
m™*«

ADDENDUM B

TONES

JWALDO

ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS

EST. l875

H0LBR00K&
MCDONOUGHre

TEL: 8 0 I - 5 2 I - 3 2 0 0
FAX: 8 0 I - 3 2 8 - O 5 3 7
I 7 0 SOUTH MAIN ST, SUITE I50O
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84IOI
WWW.JONESWALDO.COM

October 4, 2004

VIA HAND DELIVERY
JoAnne Campbell
Human Resource Director
Department of Workforce Services
140 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Re:

Lorin Blauer
Our File 15632.0001

I>eai" IV Is ('"'yiiipbc'll111

This letter is to respond to your letter of October 1, 2004, concerning your attempt to
terminate the employment of Lorin Blauer.
Mr. Blauer's medical condition (as you are by now well aware) precludes him from
performing the essential functions of the position to which he was demoted: Administrative Law
Judge/Non-Juris Doctorate. Ilis condition has not changed, and he remains disabled from the
ALJ position.
Mr. Blauer is and remains able to perform the essential f unc tjons of Legal/Enforcement
Counsel HI, the position he occupied prior to demotion. It is his understanding, however, that
this position is not available to him, and has in fact been filled by another employee. If this is
incorrect, please let me know without delay.

October 4,2004
Page 2

Please be advised that the termination of Mr. Blauer's employment under the
circumstances outlined in your letter of October 1, 2004, and given the foregoing, constitutes
constructive termination by reason of a disability, and will be pursued accordingly.
./

Cordially,

Vincent C. Rampton
VCR:jm
cc:

Susannah Kesler
Stewart Hanson
Lorin Blauer
Tom Cantrell

ADDENDUM C

GEflW

Tom Cantrell, Representative for Grievant
National Administrative Law Advocates
201 E South Temple. ^«- 721
Salt Lake City, U * . : ^ - : ! 5503

u

"UL 2 0 2006

Advocates @Tomcanti <. • • •
Telephone: 355-2005

CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
; ;;;;;,'; ;.; u i R,

Grievant and Appellant,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES,
Agency and Respondent.

: REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
:
OF
:
DECISION AND
\ L AGENCY AC!
:
:
:

Case No. 9 CSRB 83

Administrative Representative, i »-iii i amid;, for and on behalf of Grievant, Lorin
Blauer, hereby submits to the Career Sen ice Review Board (CSRB), this Request for
Reconsideration of Decision and Final Agency Action in accordance with I hah
e
: - . LtV.UlCS A c t .

11ie Grievant appealed the termination of his employment in accordance with
Utah Codef §67-19a-302 (I) which states:
A career sewice employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions,
written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the
equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning
abandonment of position to all levels of [the] grievance procedure.
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The Grievant originally appealed various issues and on various grounds, which
issues and grounds were limited by the Hearing Officer to the issues as set forth in the
Agency's Motion in Limine which stated:
The sole issue to be decided in this matter is whether Grievant was properly separated
from state employment for failure to return to work within one (1) year after the last day
worked. Utah Administrative Code R477-7-J 7 provides in relevant part:
R477-7-17. Long Term Disability

Leave.

(1) An employee who is determined eligible for the Long Term Disability Program (LTD)
shall be granted up to one year of medical leave, if warranted by a medical condition.
(a) The medical leave begins on the last day the employee worked. ...
(3) Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include:
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one year of the last day worked, the
agency shall place the employee in his previously held position or similar position in a
comparable salary range provided the employee is able to perform the essential functions
of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation.
(b) If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the position because of
a permanent disability that qualifies as a disability under the ADA, the agency shall
place the employee the agency shall place the employee in the best available, vacant
position for which the employee qualifies and is able to perform the essential functions of
the position with or without reasonable accommodation.
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within one year after the last day worked,
the employee shall be separated from state employment.
Wherefore Agency prays that it's Motion in Limine be granted.

Though the issues were limited then to the above; the Hearing Officer allowed the
addressing of the Agency's allegation, together with the Agency's evidence and
argument, that the Grievant had failed under that rule, but refused to accept the
Grievant's arguments or evidence that the Agency had failed under that rule (this is
particularly odd because the Grievant had brought the complaint).
The Hearing Officer did not make a finding of whether or not Grievant would
have been "...able to return to work within one year of the last day worked..." if the
agency had offered to place him in the position or even in the "similar Position" of Legal
Enforcement Counsel III but not limited solely to the function of holding administrative
hearings and whether Grievant was "...able to perform the essential functions of the job
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[i

. :nfbrcement Counsel III if i iot limited solely to the function oi holding

administrative hearings] with or without a reasonable accommodation."
I "he termination of Grievant's employment has apparenth Iven
CSK 13 01 i tl le g.i c 1 iiids that ill: le Gi ie\ ai it "failed to reti u i i to v <' m

-ield b ) the

oecause tl le Gi ie (i ' <

failed to submit a medical release that the A g e n c y thought he should have submitted.
I he Grievant's position that the state failed by not allow ing the reasonable

I act that almost the ei itirety oi the 1 lour-long discussion before the C S R B in this
representative's argument in support of the appeal was focused on that issue as \ e ! A>
the Grievant's defense v << M {!H \{H ?M ^ il-r*-vbi the Grievant remiss in the manm
i

him inn: '

'• n

opportunity to respond or remedy.
The C S R B and Hearing Officer wholly failed to address the question as to why, if
•*»< y- i *'u .il release was insufficient oi absent, did that justify a lerminal'nn u< ( i n n HI* *
'ill! in it mi ml v\ „II iiiiii},111 and nppnrlnintv In

H\SJH

mull oi i r m e d y .

Despite repeated attempts by the Grievant's representative to address these issues
in the hearing before the Hearing Officer and in oral argument before the CSRB, the
CSRB and the H- . \; - .• <<
appeal tosii-.i- "

.*.-.••'.

*
... Grievant's alleged J .. ,u ;*.

y
m-i a medical

release in a particular format was just cause foi termination of his employment, even
though the Grievant and 1lis attorney and administrative representative did not realize that
the oi i ei to i et urn to woi k as si ibi nit ted b;; - tl ie at toi :i :ie;; ' w as i iot si li I iciei it

ai id tl ie

Gi ie\ ai it was i iot i lotii led othei v\ ise oi w a:i J led oi tl ie consequences ii 1 ie • did i iot coi :i ipl)
This failure of the C S R B and the Hearing Officer to address such a fundamental
claim or defense, is wholly mystifying except for one possible explanation: Based on

believe they have the jurisdiction to make a ruling relative to whether or not the state
fulfilled its obligatioi % offer reasonable accommodation. If that is the case oi if there is
some other reason the C S R B is not addressing the issi les as stated ] ie i eii i
Blauer v. DWS
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reasonable accommodation was not offered or granted when requested, or why the
Grievant did not merit a warning and opportunity to remedy the problem regarding a
medical release, the CSRB should make that clear.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST
The Hearing Officer limited the issues to the question of whether or not R477-717 was violated by the agency or whether the Grievant had failed to fulfill his obligations
under that rule. However the Hearing Officer did not address the Grievant's claim under
R477-7-17 that the state, not the Grievant, failed by (1) not allowing the accommodation
requested and (2) not notifying the Grievant that they believed he was remiss in not
providing the form and style of medical release the Agency desired; and (3) not warning
the Grievant that his alleged failure to submit such a medical release in the form desired
was a terminable offence or would be construed as job abandonment.
On appeal to the CSRB, the Grievant's representative argued that the Hearing
Officer had not made a finding relative to the Grievant's charge that the Agency was in
violation of R477-7-17 by not allowing him the reasonable accommodation that would
have allowed him to return to the position of Legal Enforcement Counsel III that they
claimed they were offering him; which reasonable accommodation was simply to
restructure his job (or rather de-restructure his job) so he could continue to do his work in
the way he had done it for decades - and for which he was NOT medically disqualified
and for which he required little or no accommodation.
We request that the CSRB (1) make now such a finding or ruling; or (2) remand
back to the Hearing Officer for a finding or ruling or (3) allow this matter to be
recombined with the original grievance which is now before the CSRB at step 5.
Or, in the alternative, reverse their ruling and the decision of the Hearing Officer
and grant Grievant's complaint; order Grievant returned to his position as Legal
Enforcement Counsel III and order the Agency to offer the reasonable accommodation
asked for, that is, the allowance of the Grievant to perform his historical duties as Legal
Blauer v. DWS
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En! on cei tiei it Com n tc il ] 11 I it on i .- • ; liicli i 10 medical evidence has ever supported his
disqualification.
It is the Grievant's belief ai id understanding that tl le purpose of the Career Service
Review Board is to hear grievances of the career service employees and protect their
lights at ( oicliiiH s III ififiu ,111 , IIIIIII illlins i asi how*

HI

llii.iill lliu i l.nnis of llir Slate against

the Gi ievant, a career service employee, 1 iave beei i upheld while the claims of the
Grievant against the State have been ignored. This can be remedied by granting the
employee's grievance oi i en lai iding it back tc • step 5 an y :!! : j ::lei in: :;ig til itat it b e joii ic cl ' aill t
tl :ie I in st I: lalf • :: I tl lis gi ie vance whicl :i w as dela> ed ii i tl le coin is lit it is now bef ore a
hearing officer, it in

sense to do that because this is, as this representative clearly

demonstrated, and the record proves, the second half of the same case (the one 'M-U at
:Jo|) S) which j>eiH >as anst % fiui :» ::»>

i

•. ^s.

Respectfully submitted on behalf of the Grievant by:

Tom Cantrell
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to and Request for
Reconsideration of Prehearing Scheduling Conference Summary and Order was mailed via
first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this
day of July, 2006 (copies also sent
via email)
Philip S. Lott, Assistant Utah Attorney General

MARK L. SHURTLEFF, UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O.Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856

Tom Cantrell
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ADDENDUM D

§63-46b-12

STATE AFFAIRS

Note 3
63-46b-14C3)(a), 63-46b-15(2)(a). Bourgeous
v. Department of Commerce, Div. of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 1999, 981 P.2d
414, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 1999 UT App 146.
Licenses ®=> 22
Civil rule giving three-day extension of time to
take action if notice of required action has been
served by mail does not apply to Administrative
Procedure Act's (APA) deadlines for seeking administrative
review.
U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-12(l)(a), (l)(b)(iv); Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 6(e). Maverik Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 1993, 860 P.2d 944.
Administrative Law And Procedure @» 722.1
The 15-day time limit for filing motion for
Industrial Commission's review of administrative law judge's decision was mandatory and
jurisdictional; Commission's jurisdiction terminated upon expiration of time limit U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-82.55 (Repealed). Varian-Eimac,
Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 1989, 767 P.2d 569. Administrative Law And Procedure ®» 513; Workers'
Compensation G== 798
4. Finality of order
Where at hearing before Public Service Commission it was concluded that quantity of water
then developed was not sufficient to permit water company, a public utility to make any more
extensions findings were binding on water company, and when order contained restriction that
no further connections could be made order
controlled company's obligation to furnish water to additional connections and if other affected property owners claimed an impairment of
their rights by rulings made, their relief was by
requesting a further hearing before Commission
or by appeal and not having taken steps to have
the order modified or changed same had effect
of a judgment and its legality could not be
attacked in proceedings brought by city to condemn property of water company. U.C.A. 1^43,
76-3-23, 76-4-18, 76-6-14, North Salt Lake v.
St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., 1950, 118 Utah
600, 223 P.2d 577 Administrative Law And

Procedure
Procedure
Procedure
Procedure
<S=*202

<§=> 496; Administrative Law And
<£=> 500; Administrative Law And
<§=> 513; Administrative Law And
3> 658; Waters And Water Course*

5. Supreme court jurisdiction
The Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over challenge to legality of standby
fees imposed by water company, in that there
was no initial determination of standby issue by
Public Service Commission followed by additional application for review or rehearing
U.C.A.1953, 54-7-15, 63-46b-12, 63-46b-14
Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Service
Com'n of Utah, 1989, 779 P.2d 682 Watcn
And Watei Courses <&=> 203(12)
6. Preservation of claim
Failure of workers' compensation claimant to
raise claim that he was entitled to compensation
for an additional 50% permanent partial disability at original hearing precluded any review of
such claim on appeal. Zupon v. Industnal
Com'n of Utah, 1993, 860 P.2d 960. Workers'
Compensation^ 1856
7. Standard of review
Issues whether event giving use to appeal 1J,
employees at state training school was decision
to discontinue hazard pay or effective date of
discontinuance and whether employees filed
timely appeal were questions of law to be decided under "correction of error" standard for
reviewing decision by Personnel Review Board,
hearing officer had no substantial expertise in
area of personnel management; and determina
tion of what constituted "event giving rise to an
appeal" did not require application of basir
facts from case.
U.C.A.1953, 67-19-24
67-19-24(l)(a) (Repealed). Taylor v. Utah
State Training School, 1989, 775 P.2d 432., Ad;
ministrative Law And Procedure &=> 513; .'Officers And Public Employees <§= 72.55(1)

§ 63-46b—13. Agency review—Reconsideration
(l)(a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review
by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable,
and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party ma}
file a written request for reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific
grounds upon which relief is requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, tht filing of the request is not a
prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one
copy shall be mailed to each party by the person making the request.
(3)(a) The agency head, oi a person designated lor that puipose, shall issue a
written order granting the lequesl or denying the icquest
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Note 3

(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does not
issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for
reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 269; Laws 1988, c. 72, § 23; Laws 2001, c. 138, § 18, eff. April
30,2001.
Library References
Administrative Law and Procedure @=>513.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 15Ak513.

C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 166 to 173.

Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
HRS Fair Employment Practices 325,900,
Utah.
; Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of State Law
§ 49:87, Declaratory Orders.
HRS Fair Employment Practices § 68:44, Declaratory Orders.
Notes of Decisions
Ip general 1
Appeal 8Filing 2
Finality of action 5
Jurisdiction 7
Rules of civil procedure 4
Timeliness 3
Written order 6

reconsideration within 20 days of that ruling,
department issued order memorializing its denial of that request, and applicant sought judicial
review within 30 days of that order. U.C.A.
1953,
63-46b-12,
63-46b-13(l)(a),
63-46b-14(3)(a), 63-46b-15(2)(a). Bourgeous
v. Department of Commerce, Div. of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 1999, 981 P.2d
414, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 1999 UT App 146.
Licenses ®=> 22
1,. In general
For purposes of determining timeliness of
. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not complaint seeking judicial review of agency deauthorize employer to hie more than one re- cision denying application for professional liquest for reconsideration of decision of Indus- cense, applicant's request for reconsideration
trial Commission to deny extension of time for would have been considered denied 20 days
employer to petition for review of ALTs decision after he filed his request if agency had failed to
inri antidiscrimination hearing. U.C.A.1953, issue an order in response. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-l(9), 63-46b-16(4), (4)(h)(iv). Maverik 63-46b-13(3)(b), 63-46b-14(3)(a). Bourgeous
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of v. Department of Commerce, Div. of OccupaUtah, .1993, 860 P.2d 944. Administrative Law tional & Professional Licensing, 1999, 981 P.2d
And Procedure <S= 481; Civil Rights <^=> 1711 414, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 1999 UT App 146.
Licenses <&=> 22
2. Filing
Fact that State Tax Commission took no ac"Filing," as used in Administrative Procedure
Act's (APA) deadlines for seeking administrative tion for over 20 days on taxpayers' petition for
review, requires actual delivery of necessary reconsideration of decision assessing sales taxes
(loeuments to agency within 30-day time limit; did not compel finding, under statute providing
inailing within that time limit is insufficient. that such petition is deemed denied if no action
U&A.1953, 63-46b-12(l)(b)(iv); Rules Civ. is taken by Commission within 20 days, that
Proe., Rule 6(e). Maverik Country Stores, Inc. 30-day period for seeking judicial review of
V.'Industrial Com'n of Utah, 1993, 860 P.2d decision assessing sales taxes began 20 days
944. Administrative Law And Procedure @=> after petition was filed, where Commission ultimately issued order denying petition for recon722ttsideration; actual date of issuance of order
3. nTimeliness
marked beginning of 30-day period. U.C.A.
1953, 63-46b-13(3)(b), 63-46b-14(3)(a). Har^Complaint seeking judicial review of decision
^Department of Commerce denying applica- per Investments, Inc. v. Auditing Div., Utah
tion >for professional engineer's license was State Tax Com'n, 1994, 868 P.2d 813. Taxation
timely, though it was filed over 30 days after <©=> 1318
Agency review ruling affirming the original liFact that taxpayers filed request for judicial
cense denial, where applicant requested agenc> review of State Tax Commission decision as-
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R477-7 Leave
(5)

If the employee is unable to retun 11c: work witl fin 12 months, tl le employee shall be
separated Iron i slate employment.

(6)

An employee who file; a iniuciuierit workers compensation clann sitall be disciplined
according lo tf =*- jprovisions of H477-11.

7-17

Long Term Disability Leave.
(1)

An employee who is determined eligible for the Long 1 erm Disability Progran t (I I ID) shall be
granted up to one year of medical leave, if warranted by a medical condition.
(a)

The medical leave begins on the last day the employee worked. L I D requires a
three month waiting period before benefit payments begin. During this period, an
employee may use available sick arid converted sick leave. When those balances
are exhausted, an employee may use other leave balances available.

(b)

An employee determined eligible for Long Ten11 Disability benefits, after the tliree
month waiting period, shall be eligible for health insurance benefits beginning two
months after the last day worked. The employee is responsible for the employee
share of the premium durir ig tl ie two i nor tths following the last day worked. The
health insurance benefit shall continue without premium payment for up to 22
months or until eligibility for Medicare or Medicaid, whichever occurs first. After 22
moi ?*.. iJ * health insurance may be continued with premiums being paid in
accoiUcint e with I TD policy and practice
Upon approval of the L TD claim
(i)

Biweekly salary payments that the employee may be receiving shall cease.
If the employee received any salary payments after the three month waiting
period, the I TD benefit shall be offset by the amount received.

(ii)

i ne employee shall be paid for ren laining balances of ar II lual leave,
compensatory hours and excess hours in a lump sum payment. This
payment shall be made at the time LTD is approved unless the employee
requests in writing to receive it upon separation from state employment. No
reduction of the LTD payment shall be made to offset this payment. If the
employee returns to work prior to one year after the last day worked, the
employee has the option of buying back annual leave at the current hourly
rate.,.

(iii)

An employee with a converted sick leave balance at the time of LTD
eligibility shall have the option to receive a lump sum payout of all or part of
the balance or to keep the balance intact to pay for health and life
insurance upon retirement. The payout shall be at the rate at the time of
S TD eligibility.

(r )

, !\i i employee who retires from state govern.' *-t ;• ( ; \\} t ][ • mn\ be
eligible for up to five years health and life i n s t a n c e as pu >vided m
Subsection 67-19-14(2)(b)(ii).

(v)

I inused sick leave balance shall remain intact until the employee retires
retirement, the employee shall be eligible for the cash payout and the

Ai

R477-7 Leave
purchase of health and life insurance as provided in Subsection 67-19
14(2)(c)(i)
(2)

An employee shall continue to accrue service credit for retirement purposes while receiving
long term disability benefits

(3)

Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include

(4)

7-18.

(a)

If an employee is able to return to work within one year of the last day worked, the
agency shall place the employee in the previously held position or similar position in
a comparable salary range provided the employee is able to perlorm the essential
functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation

(b)

If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the position because
of a permanent disability that qualifies as a disability under the ADA, the agency
shall place the employee in the best available, vacant position for which the
employee qualifies and is able to perlorm the essential functions of the position with
or without reasonable accommodation

(c)

If an employee is unable to return to work within one year after the last day worked,
the employee shall be separated from state employment

An employee who files a fraudulent long term disability claim shall be disciplined according
to the provisions of R477-11

Leave Bank.
With the approval of the agency head, agencies may establish a leave bank program as follows

7-19.

(1)

Only annual leave, excess hours, compensatory time earned by an FLSA nonexempt
employee, and converted sick leave hours may be donated to a leave bank

(2)

Only employees of agencies with approved leave bank programs may donate leave hours to
another agency with a leave bank program, if mutually agreed on by both agencies

(3)

An employee may not receive donated leave until all individually accrued leave is used

(4)

Leave shall be accrued if an employee is on sick leave donated from an approved leave
bank program

Policy Exceptions.
The Executive Director, DHRM, may authorize exceptions to the provisions of this rule consistent
withR477-2-3(1)
KEY: holidays, leave benefits, vacations
July 1,2003
49-9-203
63-13-2
67-19-6
67-19-12.9
67-19-14.5
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